Afrika’nın ise Milenyum Kalkınma Hedefleri’ne (MKH) ulaşabilmesi için sürdürülebilir bir kalkınma hızı yakalaması, makro ekonomik istikrarın sağlanması, barış ve güvenliğin tesisi, demokrasi, insan hakları ve iyi yönetim konusunda gösterilen çabaların sağlam temeller üzerine oturtulması gerekmektedir.

Son dönemde bu doğrultuda gösterilen çabalar, çok sayıda Afrika ülkesinin büyüme göstergelerinde dikkate değer gelişmeleri beraberinde getirse de BM Milenyum Kalkınma Raporu’nda Afrika’nın içinde bulunduğu riskler, söz konusu hedeflere belirlenen tarih olan 2015’ten önce ulaşılamayacağını göstermektedir.

Türkiye’nin Afrika kıtasındaki geleneksel partnerleriyle ekonomik ve ticari ilişkilerini arttırması ve yeni partnerlerle de söz konusu bağlantıların geliştirilmesi gerekmektedir.

Bu kapsamda “ortak bir gelecek için dayanışma ve işbirliği” ana temasıyla gerçekleştirilen “Türkiye- Afrika İşbirliği Zirvesi” yakın dönemde hızla gelişen ilişkilerin önemli bir göstergesidir.

Türkiye- Afrika ilişkileri özellikle 1998 yılından itibaren ciddi bir dönüşüm yaşarken, söz konusu yıl kabul edilen “Afrika’ya Açılım Eylem Planı” Türkiye’nin Afrika’ya yönelik politikalarının tespitinde önemli bir dönüm noktası olarak adlandırılabilir.

Eylem Planı; genel olarak Afrika ülkeleriyle karşılıklı üst düzey ziyaretlerin gerçekleştirilmesini, uluslararası ve bölgesel kurulular nezdinde de Afrika ülkeleriyle temasların arttırılmasını, insani yardımların gerçekleştirilmesini, Türkiye’nin kıtadaki diplomatik temsilciliklerinin sayısının arttırılmasını, ekonomik, teknik, bilimsel işbirliği ve ticaret anlaşmalarının imzalanmasını ve Türkiye’nin her alanda Afrika kıtası ile yakınlaşmasını amaçlamıştır.

2005 yılının Türkiye’de “Afrika Yılı” olarak ilan edilmesi ve yine aynı yıl Türkiye’nin Afrika Birliği’nin olağan zirvelerine gözlemci üye statüsünde katılmaya başlaması, bu yılın Ocak ayında Afrika Birliği tarafından “stratejik ortak” ilan edilmesi ve Afrika Kalkınma Bankası’na üyelik konusunda atılan somut adımlar, Türkiye- Afrika ilişkilerinin geldiği noktayı çok iyi özetlemektedir.

Bu doğrultuda İstanbul’da gerçekleştirilen Türkiye- Afrika İşbirliği Zirvesi’nde kabul edilen “İstanbul Deklarasyonu” ve “Ortaklık için İşbirliği Çerçeve Belgesi”, önümüzdeki süreçte ilişkilerin daha planlı ve programlı olarak sürdürülebilmesi açısından büyük önem taşımaktadır. Türkiye, bu konuda Afrika kıtasında henüz yeterince değerlendirilmemiş çok geniş işbirliği alanları bulunduğunu düşünmektedir.

Afrika ülkelerinin ihtiyaç duyduğu teknoloji ve deneyim Türkiye’de mevcut olup, söz konusu birikimin bu kıtadaki dostlarımızla paylaşılması yönünde önemli ve yapıcı adımlar atılmaktadır.

Türkiye’nin sanayi ve dış ticaret yapısı da Afrika ekonomilerini tamamlayıcı özellikler taşımakta, bu çerçevede Afrika, özellikle küçük ve orta ölçekli firmalarımız açısından hedef pazar konumunda yer almaktadır.

Bu bağlamda 2003 yılında Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığımız tarafından uygulamaya konan “Afrika ile Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkileri Güçlendirme Stratejisi” Türkiye ile Afrika arasındaki ekonomik ve ticari ilişkilere çok önemli katkılar sağlamış, 2007 yılı sonunda Afrika ülkelerine yönelik ihracatımız 6 milyar doları, Afrika’dan ithalatımız ise 9 milyar doları aşarak dış ticaret hacmimizi 15 milyar doların üzerine çıkartmıştır. Ticari ilişkilerdeki bu olumlu gelişmelerin artarak davet etmesi ve 2011 yılının başında ticaret hacmimizin 30 milyar dolara çıkması beklenmektedir.

Şüphesiz bu anlamda Afrika kıtasındaki diplomatik temsilciliklerimizin sayısının arttırılması büyük bir önem ve zorunluluk arz etmektedir.

Türkiye- Afrika İşbirliği Zirvesi’ni bu kapsamda zamanlama açısından da son derece isabetli olarak değerlendirmek mümkündür. Çünkü ilk aşamada bu yıl 10, gelecek yıl ise 9 yeni büyükelçiliğin açılması planlanmaktadır.

Afrika ülkelerinde yeni Türk Büyükelçiliklerinin açılmasıyla birlikte Ticari Ataşeliklerimizin sayısı da artacak ve söz konusu durum, ekonomik ve ticari ilişkileri daha da geliştirecektir.

Öte yandan TİKA, kıtadaki mevcut 3 ofisi ile Afrika’nın az gelişmiş ülkelerine yönelik teknik yardımlar sağlamakta, eğitim programlarıyla da önemli görevler ve yükümlülükler üstlenmektedir. Yakın zamanda Türkiye’nin teknik yardımlarının miktarını ve kapsamını daha fazla arttırmak için TİKA’nın yeni teknik yardım ofisleri kurulacaktır.

Yakın dönemde Türkiye- Afrika ilişkilerinde gözlemlenen olumlu gelişmelerin sivil toplum nezdinde ele alınması da ayrıca memnuniyet vericidir.

Zirve kapsamında Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı’nın desteği ile DEİK ve TOBB’un düzenlediği “Türkiye- Afrika İş Forumu” ve bunun sonucunda kurulan “Türkiye- Afrika Odası” ile yine TUSKON tarafından her yıl düzenlenen “Türkiye- Afrika Dış Ticaret Köprüsü Programları” Türkiye’deki özel sektörü, Afrika ülkeleriyle tanıştırmak konusunda büyük fayda sağlamaktadır.

TASAM Afrika Enstitüsü olarak her yıl gerçekleştirdiğimiz Uluslararası Türk- Afrika Kongreleri, karşılıklı olarak Türk ve Afrika insanının birbirlerini tanımaları açısından önem arz etmekle birlikte, zirve ile uyumlu olarak 14- 16 Ağustos 2008 tarihlerinde gerçekleştirilen “Türk- Afrika STK Forumu” Türkiye’den ve Afrika’dan çok sayıda nitelikli sivil toplum kuruluşlarını bir araya getirirken, Forum sonunda kabul edilen İstanbul Deklarasyonu ile de ortak bir çerçeve oluşturulmuş ve kalıcı bir işbirliği sürecinin temelleri atılmıştır.

Türkiye- Afrika ilişkilerinde ve toplumların karşılıklı olarak tanıtımlarında basına ve medya organlarına da önemli sorumluklar düşmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, Türkiye- Afrika ilişkileri genel anlamda olumlu ve istikrarlı bir seyir izlemektedir. Özellikle son dönemde Türkiye’nin farklı coğrafyalarda izlediği etkin politikaları, çok taraflı bir dış politika anlayışının doğal bir sonucu olarak tanımlamak mümkündür. Bunun bir diğer önemli sonucu da söz konusu gelişmelerin, Türk Dış Politikasında büyük önem arz eden AB ile ilişkilere de yansımalarının olumlu yönde olacağı ve bu kapsamda Türkiye’ye uluslararası platformda artı bir saygınlık kazandıracağıdır.

Türkiye ve Afrika’nın birlikte geleceğe güvenle bakabilmeleri, günümüzdeki işbirliğinin yanı sıra geleceğe yönelik uygun stratejilerin belirlenerek uygulanabilmesi ile mümkün olacaktır.

TÜRKİYE- AFRİKA STK FORUMU İSTANBUL DEKLARASYONU

Andrin Raj

The threat of piracy in the Somalian waters of the Gulf of Aden has been recently an ongoing struggle for ships and vessels enroute these waters. The instability of Somalia however goes back as far as the beginning of the Somalian civil war that dates back to the early 1990s and the collapse of the state. The threat of maritime piracy and terrorism in the Gulf of Aden had only increased significantly in the last 6 years.[1]As much as securing the Somalian waters as well as dispatching multi-forces to the region, it will not be of sufficient real benefit to most ships and vessels and the pirates know this! As stated in the Singapore Times, Somali pirates were undeterred on the new EU launch operation.[2] It might reduce the numbers but not drastically enough to stop the threats.

As the EU has engaged its war ships to the region, one must note that they are only committed to European ships based on an initial proposal. But with the Operation Atalanta incorporated on the 13th of December 2008, it specifically states otherwise.[3] The forces deployed there be it NATO, US or others are primarily to protect their flagships as well as ships and vessels bound for trade into their respective countries.[4] The economies of scale does not show that it will be cost effective to deploy war ships to the region neither does it show if it would lower the level of threats. The Gulf of Aden is a wide area to be covered by any military operations. It is practically impossible to cover the whole of the Gulf by just concentrating on additional forces. It is not only deploying them, the cost for logistics, crew, support ships to name a few is a much-needed affair for this sort of large-scale operations. Other means to address the issues needs to also be addressed, such as diplomacy, dialogues, education and eradication of the root problems with Somalia, Yemen, Sudan and the countries that are on the coastline of the Gulf.

In April of this year, the Japanese Government will introduce two Navy destroyers to the Horn of Africa in existence of its current ships already deployed to assist the ongoing joint patrol coalition forces, in logistical support under the mission of Operation Enduring Freedom.[5] On board these ships will also be members of the Japanese Coast Guard crewmembers, as the Japanese Navy does not have the power or authority to carry out arrest. [6] The Japanese government will also be introducing its new “Maritime Police Laws” for military ships to be able to have the power to arrest and detain suspected pirate ships or smugglers around the globe, especially in the Gulf of Aden. These laws are similar to the Japanese Police Code and the Japanese Coast Guard. The Japanese government will address the issues in a more comprehensive manner to suit the laws of the sea.[7] The Japanese Government’s role in the fight for piracy and terrorism is not only to monitor its trade routes bound for Japan, but a response to the threats of maritime piracy and terrorism that may be prone within their shores as with any other nations, in the fight against maritime piracy and terrorism. As Japan’s constitution prohibits its military intervention, Japan will have to look into diplomacy, training and engaging in area pertaining to the threats of maritime piracy and terrorism. A new study, the New Japanese Security Strategy-Multi Level Cooperative Security Strategy completed on October of 2008, for the National Defense Program, will also highlight new roles for security and strategy practices in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces objectives in the near future.[8] According to sources, it will take effect sometime in the next coming quarter of 2009.
Piracy in the Somalian waters is no normal “Pirates of the Caribbean”. They are well trained, a militia, incorporating military trained tactics and are part of terrorist operations in order to support these organizations.[9] The lucrative image of calling oneself a “pirate” is a false image that most must come to do about. The issue pertaining to economics has a means to engage in piracy needs to be look into on a different perspective as Pirates/Terrorists have found an easier means of supporting their organizations as the waters are vast and heavily-trafficked and lack protection as compared to land operations.

Al-Qeada has proven its land and air operations to be lethal and the next course of attack will be from the sea. The USS Cole bombing was a means for trial and error and they have come along way to be well trained and equipped for a sea attack. Gateways for major water routes around the world, including the Straits of Malacca need to be protected at all course. My colleague, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, always said this to me, “Terrorist needs to be lucky once but we need to be lucky all the time!”[10]

It may have started off as piracy but terrorist organizations have infiltrated these “so called” pirates. The water ways of Somalia and its coastline are a “cowboy” region with lack of a functioning central government, corrupt practices as well as instability of their governments and hence a haven for piracy and terrorists to operate. Current terrorist organizations operating in Somalia are the “Shebaab al-Mujahideen” movement and some “jihadist” with no ideological purpose[11]. This can lead to an influence from other operating terrorist organization, that may take the advantage of using propaganda and giving support to local “jihadist” in terms of monetary and food supplies.

Osama Bin-Laden, who operated freely in Sudan after his release from Saudi Arabia, was developing Sudan in many lucrative businesses that he formed.[12] Some of these were construction companies operating in Sudan to fruit export and trading companies to Europe and so forth.[13] Al-Qaeda managed to infiltrate these rogue gangs and has assisted them in monetary funding for their community. As such, “unknown” camps were developed under the Al-Qaeda banner in Sudan and Somalia to train these pirates into a militia that will help retain Al-Qaeda’s strength in the region.[14] The costal lines of Sudan are safe in general as the Sudanese government has stronger control over the coastline thus the safe and piracy secured coastline. This is not true of its internal area as tribal disputes are a main concern and harder to safeguard.[15]

Some of them may portray to be pirates but have been linked to terror operations as seen in the bombings of the USS Cole. As the gap of terrorism and piracy became a question, so did the “rogue” groups of Somalia. They found with their new skills, militia training, arms supported by terrorist organizations and the know how of hijackings, that piracy was the answer to many of their needs as well as supporting terror operations when needed. Today, piracy is even more rampant in the Somalian waters as these “pirates” are infact “terrorists” as well and has skills no other “Pirates of the Caribbean” have.
The “war on terror” has to be dealt with in this region with a more drastic move. Somalia and Sudan and some parts of the Somalian and Yemen coastline have been breeding grounds for piracy and terrorists, and it is only wise to work with these governments to help eradicate the growth of terrorists and piracy as it is now rampant and the two are very much linked together. The international community should provide as much assistance to these countries as much as it is assisting other countries in the “war on terror”. The need to educate and to provide support in “winning the hearts and minds” is of up most important. This has been proven in Malaysia during the communist insurgency till the collapse of it in the late 80s.[16]

Besides the “war on terror”, in order to prevent the rise in “Maritime PT Syndrome” is to have Private Military Companies work with cargo and vessels owners for protection covering a wide area of security issues that pertains to ship safety, security and protection.[17] This is one of many ways one can prevent hijacking of vessels without huge amounts of ransom being paid out by insurers as well as protecting, preventing and saving lives of crewmembers. The cost of having armed or security personnel is much less than having a large-scale military operation. Having to engage onboard security personnel as a vessel exits the Suez Canal into the Red Sea, armed or security personnel can be deployed on vessels from Djibouti of Somalia to ships or vessels in the Port of Aden, as Djibouti is relatively a safe area along the coast.[18] The vessel can sail through the Gulf of Aden into the Indian Ocean exchanging personnel from a point along the Indian Ocean towards Kenya from the Port of Mombasa and vice versa. Ships or vessels do not necessarily need to embark on ports, as PMCs can send out their personnel by boats towards a vessel upon its arrival at both junctures. PMCs can also work directly from “home bound” ships to its final destination and vice versa by engaging rules of the sea in security protection.

The cost of armed or security personnel should not be considered a “high cost” as it is infact a misinformed issue.[19]  Hence military joint patrols can be deployed with lesser economies of scale if the need so requires it.[20] As much as it is known to be ineffective by some scholars, experts in military cum scholars do not think alike, as it will definitely bring down the level of attacks and threats.[21] The Somalian government has given its approval for some foreign government to use necessary force when needed in confronting pirates in its territorial waters and the area around the Somalian coastline. It will be wise to take the offer to approach governments within the gulf region and to discuss means and ways of addressing the issue and by incorporating private military organization to assist ship owners.

However the need to act within legal boundaries set by governments of Somalia, Yemen and the nations along the sea-lanes as well as the route from the Suez Canal is crucial. Using weapons on board can be an issue to relevant governments as it passes through their territorial waters. PMCs also offer “non-lethal weapons” and other security equipments in protecting ships and vessels. It does not necessarily mean “arming” them with lethal weapons. But the relevance to be armed is an option to be considered. This is crucial, as pirates will have no option but to hurl away from “armed security” on board.
The Gulf of Aden commands access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Water route for ships and vessels from the Port of Aden towards the Indian Ocean and beyond are on international waters, and as such PMC’s will be operating in international waters. The designated ports from the exit and entry points of the Red Sea and the use of Djibouti in Somalia as well as the coastal Port of Mombasa in Kenya can be used as bases for PMCs. The Port of Nishtun in Yemen can also be a base for PMCs to operate, as this will be the last of the route heading towards the Arabian Sea. The island of Socorta that belongs to Yemen is also a possible base as its inhabitants are small in population and PMCs can use the island in logistical purpose. However this needs to be studied by PMCs as this may incur some cost in setting up a base. Based on locations suggested, PMCs can operate on an efficient basis. As weapons may be used, the relevant countries along the Gulf and beyond need to have an understanding and to come out with a framework that can address the issues of armed security on ship and vessels. These are suggestions on ways PMCs can use their resources to their advantage.

Private Military organizations, such as Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre (SAPSC), the first of its kind based in Malaysia, comprising a Think Tank and Private Military Service Operator, provides training for government security forces and can provide armed security personnel on board for private vessel owners.[22] The company with its new acoustic devise also provides state-of-the-art equipment for ships and vessel protection. The LRAD is a non-lethal weapon that has been proven in the Somalian waters against piracy. It was used off Somalia, by a cruise ship to repel a pirate attack armed with a Rocket Propelled Gun (RPG’s) and sub-machine guns.[23]

A few knick-knacks need to be ironed out at first. Are the insurance companies willing to take the risk off armed or security personnel on board? This is something that owners, insurance companies need to rethink about. A suggestion would be for the ship owners to insure the “security personnel” from the cargo and crew hence having a separate coverage for the insurance coverage. Second, would it jeopardize the security of ship and crewmembers as on board, as armed or security personnel will enhance casualties if there was a cross fire, having a crew injured! But many a times if there was a cross fire from armed personnel on board a vessel and a pirate boat, pirates will turn away as they know the ship captain would be calling for assistance. It will take approximately 15 minutes for a multi force to respond to the attack. [24]

Even though, multi forces are there to protect the ships and vessels, one must remember that it only takes 15-20 minutes of a pirate attack to board a ship.[25] And if they can’t they will leave the ship. This is exactly how much time it takes for the multi forces to approach a pirate attack. If they manage to board a vessel, no multi-force can go near the ship to make any engagements with the pirates. It becomes the sole responsibility of the countries flagship and government.

But on the economies of scale, on-board security personnel will protect the ship and its crewmembers from any attempt as well as save insurance companies huge payouts on ransom and other insurance compensations. Any pirate will do away if they are confronted from a distance with armed security firing or using state of the art “non-lethal weapon”. This will also ensure enough time for any multi forces to approach the vessel. Pirates will not stay if there is confrontation from the vessel as it is too risky for their small boats and knowing that the multi forces will be at hand in a fraction of a time.

Andrin Raj ( This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. ) is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) & Director/Security and Terrorism Analyst for Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre (SAPSC). The views expressed are of his own and does not reflect those of JIIA and SAPSC

[1] Interview 20th Jan 09; Rear Admiral, JMSDF (Ret) former Commander of the Japanese Coalition force “ Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) of Escort Flottia 4 in the Gulf of Aden
[2] Singapore New Straits Times, December 6th 2008
[3] Operation Atalanta, 13 December 2008, Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
[4] Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
[5] Interview 20 Jan 09Rear Admiral, JMSDF (Ret) former Commander of the Japanese Coalition force “ Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) of Escort Flottia 4 in the Gulf of Aden
[6] Interview 20 Jan 09Rear Admiral, JMSDF (Ret) former Commander of the Japanese Coalition force “ Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) of Escort Flottia 4 in the Gulf of Aden
[7] Interview 20th Jan 09; Rear Admiral, JMSDF (Ret) former Commander of the Japanese Coalition force “ Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) of Escort Flottia 4 in the Gulf of Aden
[8] Shoichi Katayama, Research Fellow, Tokyo Foundation
[9] Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
[10] Quote from Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Adviser Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
[11] NEFA Foundation, Jan 15th; USA
[12] Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Adviser, Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
[13] Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Adviser, Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
[14] Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
[15] Interview 20th Jan 09; Rear Admiral, JMSDF (Ret) former Commander of the Japanese Coalition force “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) of Escort Flottia 4 in the Gulf of Aden
[16] Interview 15th December; Lt.Col Sani Royan, Chief of Psyop Operations, Military Intelligence, MOD Malaysia
[17] Andrin Raj, Security Expert, SAPSC-TASK Int. UK
[18] Interview 20th Jan 09; Rear Admiral, JMSDF (Ret) former Commander of the Japanese Coalition force “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) of Escort Flottia 4 in the Gulf of Aden
[19] Andrin Raj, Security Expert, SAPSC-TASK Int. UK
[20] Andrin Raj, Security Expert, SAPSC-TASK Int. UK
[21] Andrin Raj, Security Expert, SAPSC-TASK Int. UK
[22] Andrin Raj, Director, SAPSC
[23] American Technologies, USA / DNA SDN BHD Malaysia
[24] Interview Nov 08; Col. Martin Bannon, US Air Attaché, US Embassy, Kuala Lumpur
Abbreviation: Maritime PT – Maritime Piracy & Terrorism
LRAD – Long Range Acoustic Devise
PMC – Private Military Company
[25] Interview Nov 08;Col. Martin Bannon, US Air Attaché, US Embassy, Kuala Lumpur